Plotinus: The First Philosopher of the Unconscious by Hendrix, John S
Roger Williams University
DOCS@RWU
School of Architecture, Art, and Historic
Preservation Faculty Publications
School of Architecture, Art, and Historic
Preservation
2014
Plotinus: The First Philosopher of the Unconscious
John S. Hendrix
Roger Williams University, jhendrix@risd.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/saahp_fp
Part of the Architecture Commons
This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Architecture, Art, and Historic Preservation at DOCS@RWU.
It has been accepted for inclusion in School of Architecture, Art, and Historic Preservation Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of
DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hendrix, John S., "Plotinus: The First Philosopher of the Unconscious" (2014). School of Architecture, Art, and Historic Preservation
Faculty Publications. Paper 35.
http://docs.rwu.edu/saahp_fp/35
Plotinus: 








Plotinus is sometimes referred to as “the first philosopher of the uncon-
scious.” In his 1960 essay “Consciousness and Unconsciousness in Ploti-
nus,” Hans Rudolph Schwyzer called Plotinus “the discoverer of the 
unconscious.” What exactly was Plotinus’ unconscious? In the Enneads, Plo-
tinus asks about soul and intellect: “Why then…do we not consciously grasp 
them…? For not everything which is in the soul is immediately perceptible” 
(V.1.12.1–15).1 In the De anima of Aristotle, “Mind does not think intermit-
tently” (430a10–25).2 We cannot remember eternal mind in us, because pas-
sive mind is perishable. Is the productive or active intelligence in our mind 
that of which we are not conscious? Can productive intelligence be com-
pared to unconscious thought? Plotinus suggests that we do not notice the 
activity of intellect because it is not engaged with objects of sense percep-
tion. The intellect must involve an activity prior to awareness. Awareness of 
intellectual activity only occurs when thinking is reflected as in a mirror, but 
knowledge in discursive reason, reason transitioning from one object to the 
next in a temporal sequence, is not self-knowledge. Only in the activity of 
intellect inaccessible to discursive reason is thinking as the equivalent of be-
ing. The intellectual act in mind is only apprehended when it is brought into 
the image-making power of mind through the logos or linguistic articulation; 
“we are always intellectually active but do not always apprehend our activi-
ty” (IV.3.30.1–17). If the Intellectual is the unconscious, then unconscious 
reason is superior to conscious reason. The inability of conscious reason to 
know itself in the illusion of self-consciousness is the premise of psychoa-
nalysis in the twentieth century. 
      In the Enneads, the human mind or soul “sometimes reasons about the 
right and good and sometimes does not…” (V.1.11.1–15). If this is the case, 
then there must be an element of thought which knows what the right and 
good are, not intermittently and indecisively, but permanently and without 
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question. This must be intellect, which rather than reason discursively about 
the right and the good, possesses the right and the good, based on the princi-
ple and cause of Intellect. The principle and cause of Intellect is undivided in 
discursive reason, and abides in mind but not in place. As such, the principle 
and cause can remain undivided. 
      “Why then,” Plotinus asks, “when we have such great possessions, do we 
not consciously grasp them, but are mostly inactive in these ways, and some 
of us are never active at all?” (V.1.12. 1–15). Intellect, what comes before 
Intellect, or the first cause, and what results from Intellect, or soul, which is 
itself “ever-moving,” are all “always occupied in their own activities,” but 
those activities are not always perceptible; they are only perceptible when 
they somehow enter into perception, when their activity is shared. Since we 
are mostly preoccupied with our activities of perception, it is difficult to be 
aware of when the activities of Intellect are shared. Nevertheless, when the 
activities are shared with perception, then “conscious awareness takes 
place.” Otherwise we are unconscious of the activities of Intellect in discur-
sive or conscious reason; we are not aware of the role that unconscious 
thought plays in the activities of our conscious thought and perception. In 
order to become aware of the activities of unconscious thought or Intellect, 
“we must turn our power of apprehension inwards, and make it attend to 
what is there.” 
      First it is necessary to examine one’s soul. The powers of perception in 
soul are only capable of perceiving external objects. Discursive reason in 
soul makes judgments based on the mental images which come from sense 
perception. The mental images come from sensible objects and are organized 
by reason, in combinations and divisions. It should be kept in mind that the 
mental images themselves are not entirely dependent on the sensible forms, 
though, because the mental images play a role in the determination of the 
sensible forms to begin with, and the result is not just the sensible form im-
printed in the mind’s eye, but a combination of the sensible form and the in-
telligible form. As Plotinus says, “as for the things which come to it from 
Intellect,” the intelligible forms, “it observes what one might call their im-
prints, and has the same power also in dealing with these…” (V.3.2.1–26). 
Understanding in perception on the part of reason is the result of a dialectical 
process of combinations of sensible and intelligible forms in the mind, which 
is an unconscious process.  
      Any knowledge or awareness of this process can only come from Intel-
lect, and not discursive reason in soul. But a part of Intellect has to be in 
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soul, just as a part of the Aristotelian active intellect has to be in potential 
intellect. The part of Intellect which is in soul, though, does not have the ca-
pacity of pure Intellect to be aware of itself—self-awareness in soul can only 
come from Intellect higher than soul, intellect not connect to the body or 
sense perception. In other words, conscious reason cannot know itself. Dis-
cursive reason in soul cannot know itself or have self-awareness, but it can 
know where it is: somewhere between Intellect and sense perception. Dis-
cursive or conscious reason “has understanding of the impressions which it 
receives from both sides,” from Intellect and sense perception. It can be 
aware of what it receives from perception, and it can be aware of what it re-
ceives from Intellect, the higher forms to which it has access. How does con-
scious reason have such understanding? 
      In Enneads V.3.3, impressions are received by discursive reason from 
sense perception, but discursive reason can only respond to them with the 
help of memory. With the help of memory, discursive reason then performs 
analytical operations on the impressions from sense perception, “taking to 
pieces what the image-making power gave it…”. Any judgments that discur-
sive reason makes about what it receives from sense perception can only be 
the result of what is already in discursive reason. In order for discursive rea-
son to make any particular judgment about something perceived, discursive 
reason has to contain the quality that it judges. The only way that discursive 
reason can contain a quality is if it is illuminated by Intellect, as the sun 
would illuminate an object in vision. Discursive reason is not conscious of 
the illumination of Intellect, of the reception of the reflection of Intellect, as 
in a mirror, because again it is too engaged in perceiving and judging exter-
nal objects. Only Intellect is capable of observing and knowing itself, which 
is a kind of reason inaccessible to discursive or conscious reason. Discursive 
reason makes use of Intellect, unknowingly, in perception and logical 
thought, when discursive reason is in accord with Intellect, and can be af-
fected by it. Discursive reason is only in accord with Intellect to the extent 
that discursive reason has knowledge of such accord; in other words, uncon-
scious thought can only be known in conscious thought.  
      While impressions are received through sense perception, “it is not we 
ourselves who are the perceivers…,” because the mechanisms that allow 
perception to take place, from Intellect, are not accessible by conscious 
thought. We can define ourselves and have self-identity only in our con-
scious, discursive reason, not in the unconscious mechanisms behind percep-
tion, and not in the unconscious mechanisms of Intellect. Thus “we are this, 
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the principal part of soul, in the middle between two powers…,” neither of 
which is accessible to our knowledge or awareness. Thus our self-knowledge 
and identity can be described as being caught between two mirrors; we can 
perceive the reflections of sense perception and Intellect, but we cannot see 
beyond the source of the reflections. 
      We do not notice the activity of Intellect because “it is not concerned 
with any object of sense,” as Plotinus says in Enneads I.4.10. We are gener-
ally only aware of our mind’s activity when it is connected to sense percep-
tion and thinking about the objects of sense, the nous hylikos. If Intellect, 
and soul, are understood to come before sense perception and discursive rea-
son, as necessary ground for those activities, then it must be considered that 
the activities of Intellect and soul are continually active, in making sense 
perception and discursive reason possible, although we do not have immedi-
ate awareness of or access to those activities. “There must be an activity pri-
or to awareness,” says Plotinus, if ‘thinking and being are the same’,” that is, 
if being is given by thought. When awareness of the activity of Intellect ex-
ists, or is produced, intellectual activity is reflected back to conscious 
thought as in a mirror reflection, since the activity of Intellect itself is not 
present to the dianoetic self, in front of the mirror as it were. Or the activity 
of Intellect is reflected back to dianoetic thought as logos, since the lower 
soul can only perceive it as such. In order for that to happen, the surface of 
the mirror has to be clear, or, in other words, the power of soul has to be 
clear of disturbances or distractions from sense perceptions. It is necessary 
for the individual to not be distracted by or focused on the objects of sense 
perception, in order to disconnect the mind’s activities from them, and con-
centrated on the premises for the possibilities of those sense perceptions. It is 
in self-consciousness that the mind is able to perceive the unconscious ac-
tivity which makes conscious activity possible.  
      What is reflected as a mirror image, which is a function of the image-
making power or imagination in soul, is the activity of Intellect, which must 
always be there, whether the mirror reflects it or not. The reflective power of 
the mirror needs to be turned on, through the will of thinking, and the mirror 
needs to function correctly. It is not possible to have direct access to the ac-
tivities of Intellect or unconscious thought, but only to their reflections in 
soul or conscious thought. In the same way, it is not possible to have direct 
access to dreams, but only to their images as preserved by memory in wak-
ing, conscious life. Memory serves the image-making power to preserve im-
ages and translate them into words, so that the images which are the product 
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of sense perception can play a role as the vocabulary elements of thinking 
activity in discursive reason.  
      When the mirror imaging power of imagination is functioning correctly, 
the activity and images of Intellect, what is prior to sense perception, can be 
perceived by soul in the same way that objects of sense perception are per-
ceived by sight, although the light by which they are illuminated is not the 
light of the sun, but rather an inner light, the light of Intellect itself. In order 
for the activities and images of Intellect to be perceived in the same way as 
sense objects, they have to mimic or take the form of sense objects and activ-
ities. Unconscious thought can only be known by conscious thought to the 
extent that it mimics conscious thought, and conforms to its boundaries and 
limitations. The full extent of unconscious thought cannot be known by con-
scious thought because of the limitations of conscious thought, just like the 
full extent of the sensible world cannot be known by sense perception, be-
cause of the limitations of sense perception.  
      The operation of the mirror of self-reflection, or self-consciousness of 
intellectual activity, depends on the smooth functioning, harmony and bal-
ance of the body in relation to the sensible world. The mirror is a property of 
nous hylikos, the physical functioning of mind in relation to body. If the 
body does not function properly, the self-reflexive powers of mind cannot 
function properly. If the mirror is broken because the body is not functioning 
properly, there is no image for thought and intellect to operate with; the im-
age-making power or imagination is a also a property of nous hylikos and 
bodily function in the sensible, although it is also a property of Intellect, and 
in fact is seen by Plotinus as occupying the midpoint between Intellect and 
sense perception. But for these purposes, the mirror in the mind, as a proper-
ty of the body, is necessary for the mind to perceive the activities of Intellect 
in connection with images, the images reflected in the well-functioning mir-
ror of the soul. The activity of Intellect itself does not necessarily involve a 
connection with images, but its connection with images is necessary in order 
to be perceived. 
      According to Plotinus, there are “a great many valuable activities, theo-
retical and practical, which we carry on both in our contemplative and active 
life even when we are fully conscious, which do not make us aware of them” 
(I.4.10.20–34). This is an explicit recognition of the existence of the modern 
concept of the unconscious. It is possible to be involved in an activity or an 
act of contemplation, virtuous action or reading, for example, without being 
aware of such activity or thought. In fact, conscious awareness, according to 
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Plotinus, “is likely to enfeeble the very activities of which there is con-
sciousness…”. Plotinus seems to be suggesting that there is something 
stronger and superior in mind to conscious thought, which is Intellect. Con-
scious thought and activity, and consciousness itself, are weak forms of 
thought and activity. Nowhere in the Enneads does Plotinus suggest the pos-
sibility or concept of a “higher consciousness,” contrary to the opinion of 
some commentators. Instead, Plotinus says that “only when they are alone,” 
referring to the activities of thought of which there is consciousness, “are 
they pure and more genuinely active and living.” Thoughts are stronger and 
purer when they are “alone,” when they are unperceived by conscious 
thought and perception, when they are what we call “unconscious.”  
      Thoughts are purer before they have been connected to the images which 
allow them to be perceptible to consciousness; they are closer to their source 
in Intellect. They are purer as the prior ground for consciousness and experi-
ence in sense perception. The unconscious is the pure ground for conscious 
thought and activity, and unconscious thoughts are necessarily corrupted 
when they become conscious thoughts, if just in their connection to the im-
age in imagination. The power of imagination is the great facilitator for Plo-
tinus, but also the great corruptor. The value of life is increased, and the 
quality of the soul is increased, when mind is less fragmented and dispersed 
in the acts of sense perception and discursive reason, but rather “gathered 
together in one in itself.”  
      Plotinus also calls the reflections of the images of Intellect “imprints” or 
“impressions,” so they are seen as the eidos or form which is not connected 
to a material form or morphe, in the same way that the images of sense per-
ception themselves are the eidos and not the morphe, imprints or impressions 
of forms that are received in connection to the material objects, as if there 
are two lights, or a double light, shining on the material object: the light of 
the intelligible which illuminates the eidos, and the light of the sensible or 
the sun which illuminates matter. Judgment in discursive reason is based on 
the perception of the eidos of the sensible object, as it is subjected to the 
mechanisms of combination and division in apperception, which are the 
same mechanisms which Sigmund Freud attributes to the image-making 
power of unconscious thought in the formation of dream images from dream 
thoughts, what he calls condensation and displacement. The judgment in dis-
cursive reason is also based on the perception of the image connected to 
thoughts from Intellect, as the objects of sense perception are processed 
through the unconscious mechanisms of imagination and memory which 
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make the sense perception possible in the first place, then translate the ob-
jects of sense perception into a totality, even through the combinations and 
divisions, which makes being possible, and which makes thinking equivalent 
to being. 
      Thinking is a dialectical process which is facilitated by imagination, 
which is suspended between Intellect, the source of thinking, and sense per-
ception, the object of thinking. The dialectical process involves the imprint 
of the sense object or sensible form in perception, the imprint of the idea of 
the object or intelligible form in the imagination or image-making power, the 
memory or recollection of past thoughts and perceptions in relation to the 
present thought, the “recollections” of the soul, the transformation of the im-
age, both sensible and intelligible, into the word in language, both the spo-
ken word and the word prior to speech in Intellect, the logos endiathetos, and 
the fitting together of sensible image, intelligible image, recollected sensible 
image, recollected intelligible image, sensible word, and intelligible word, in 
a process which requires the anticipation of the perception of the image or 
word in relation to the recollection of the intelligible image or word in Intel-
lect, as it is perceived as a reflection or imprint in mind. When the soul is “in 
the intelligible world it has itself too the characteristic of unchangeability” 
(IV.4.2), but “if it comes out of the intelligible world, and cannot endure uni-
ty, but embraces its own individuality and wants to be different” (IV.4.3) it 
then acquires memory, in discursive reason and temporal succession. 
Memory helps keep the soul partly in the intelligible world, the rational soul, 
but it also brings soul down to the sensible world, the irrational soul. 
      As the perception of a sensible object entails both the eidos of the object 
and the eidos of the intelligible idea of the object in unconscious thought, 
“actual seeing is double” (V.5.7). The eye “has one object of sight which is 
the form of the object perceived by the sense, and one which is the medium 
through which the form of its object is perceived…”. The medium, the intel-
ligible idea of the object which comes from Intellect and is connected to the 
imprint that is reflected in the mirror of the mind’s eye, precedes the percep-
tion of the sensible form, and is the cause of the perception of the sensible 
form. In normal conscious thought and perception, the form and the medium 
cannot be separated, and the form of the sensible object is unknowingly per-
ceived as a sensible object, without its sensible or intelligible form. While 
vision in sense perception is distracted in the act of perception of an object, it 
is not capable of self-reflection in its outer act.  
      In V.3.8, Plotinus explains that intelligibles exist prior to bodies, and 
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cannot be thought of in terms of color or form until they are connected to 
such in imagination. Intelligibles themselves are “naturally invisible,” invis-
ible even to the soul which possesses them. In the physical world, something 
is seen when it is illuminated by enough light. In the intelligible world, 
something can only be seen by itself, because seeing is only through itself, 
and not through a medium. Seeing something through itself in the intelligible 
is like light seeing itself, seeing itself as the source of itself, which is inac-
cessible even to Intellect. Once the intelligible light is seen, sensible light in 
perception is no longer necessary for understanding. Soul is an image, a re-
flection or likeness of Intellect; conscious thought is an image, a reflection or 
likeness of unconscious thought. The illumination of a sensible object by 
light is a reflection or likeness of the illumination of Intellect by intelligible 
light. Knowledge of Intellect depends on the separation of the soul from the 
body. 
      Conscious thought and sense perception involve a fragmentation, disper-
sal, and diminution of the powers of thought. In order to avoid this fragmen-
tation and diminution of thought, it is necessary to will oneself into self-
reflection, and to will one’s intellect away from the objects of sense percep-
tion toward the images of Intellect reflected in soul, then away from those 
images to the prior source of the images in Intellect. It is necessary to will 
oneself towards one’s unconscious; the more access there is to the uncon-
scious activities of one’s mind, the stronger and purer are the conscious ac-
tivities. Plotinus’ interest in the unconscious, as we call it, is for the benefit 
of the growth and development of the individual. With the science of psy-
choanalysis in the twentieth-century, the concept of the unconscious has tak-
en on a different meaning, as the source of conflict and discord in conscious 
thought and activity, and as the source of cures and solutions for that conflict 
and discord. Psychoanalysts have turned the unconscious into an instrument 
for therapeutic practices, and the unconscious is no longer seen as a purer 
form of thought that can be accessed by each individual in order to grow and 
develop in thought and action, as Plotinus clearly intended it to be. Perhaps a 
return to the concept of the unconscious in Plotinus could add a great deal to 
the practice of psychoanalysis. 
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